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Multiple-goal pursuit and conflict between personal life-defining goals can be considered
part of everyday business in most individuals’ lives. Given the potentially detrimental
effects of goal conflict—for example, impaired well-being or poor performance—the
literature on goal conflict is surprisingly scattered due to heterogeneous methodological
approaches and technical terms. Little empirical research has addressed the
conceptualization of goal conflict against the background of differing understandings
from a structure-like and a process-like perspective. In the present article, we outline
theoretical foundations of goal conflict from two perspectives: a structure- and a
process-like perspective. Based on a comparative analysis and integration of these two
perspectives, we systematically review empirical studies on goal conflict over 30 years
of research. In doing so, we identify and discuss important conceptual dimensions of
goal conflict, namely, goal conflict as a cognitive construct and an experiential instance,
a focus on goal interrelations or on specific goal properties, and resource vs. inherent
conflict, and the potential of these distinctions to further research on goal conflict. Finally,
we present major challenges and pose questions that need to be addressed by future
research.
Keywords: goal conflict, action goal, motivational interference, motivation, self-regulation, personal goals
GOAL CONFLICT—OUR CONSTANT COMPANION
When individuals are asked to list the goals they are currently striving to attain, they typically
list between 10 and 15 goals (Little, 1983). Such so-called personal goals typically refer to
idiographic goals of mid-level abstraction that share a life defining and rather long-term character.
Although individuals may not try to pursue all of these personal goals (Riediger and Freund,
2004) simultaneously, multiple-goal pursuit can be considered the rule rather than the exception
(Atkinson and Birch, 1970; Hofer, 2007; Unsworth et al., 2014). To manage multiple-goal pursuit
successfully, people constantly have to check their priorities, balance their resource allocations,
and plan their actions. Even so, multiple-goal pursuit may still be difficult or even impossible to
achieve—especially when goals are interfering (as opposed to facilitating; Riediger and Freund,
2004) with each other. Researchers and laypeople alike speak of goal conflict when “a goal that
a person wishes to accomplish interferes with the attainment of at least one other goal that the
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individual simultaneously wishes to accomplish” (Emmons et al.,
1993, p. 531). Such goal conflict may be further differentiated
according to its nature being based on either limited resources,
such as time, energy, and money (resource goal conflict), or
incompatible goal attainment strategies or end states (inherent
goal conflict; Michalak et al., 2004; Riediger and Freund, 2004;
Segerstrom and Solberg Nes, 2006).
In general, goal conflict appears to have negative effects
on individuals’ performance (e.g., Locke et al., 1994; Slocum
et al., 2002) and well-being (e.g., Emmons, 1986; Emmons
and King, 1988; Perring et al., 1988; Brunstein, 1993; cf.
Gray et al., 2017). Therefore, psychological researchers from
various psychological subdisciplines aim at understanding goal
conflict (e.g., organizational psychology; Suliman and Abdulla,
2005; clinical psychology; Karoly and Ruehlman, 1996; or
health psychology; Gebhardt and Maes, 1998). Nevertheless,
the psychological literature on goal conflict is relatively scarce
and rather disconnected. Major lines of research have taken
different perspectives, used different wording, employed different
operationalizations, and rarely referred to one another. Such lack
of coherence and—eventually—conceptual clarity may threaten
the validity of empirical results and lead to meta-analytic reviews
being limited by a lack of comparable research designs (Gray
et al., 2017). In addition, much attention has been paid to
(negative) outcomes associated with goal conflict, whereas goal
conflict itself—its conceptualization and delineation from its
antecedents and immediate consequences on experience and
behavior—have hardly been addressed.
Against this background, the present paper aims at identifying
and reconciling major perspectives of research on conflict
between accessible personal goals that are pursued through
consciously regulated actions. In particular, we apply two
perspectives to do so: a structure-like perspective that focuses
on relationships between goals and their connection to central
aspects of the self, and a process-like perspective that focuses
on different action phases, from intention formation to
goal disengagement. Based on a comparative analysis and
a systematic literature review, we argue that research from
these perspectives—each in its own right—has contributed
substantially to our knowledge of goal conflict. However, we
also outline the need to integrate both perspectives to advance
research on goal conflict by considering relations and potential
conflicts between goal systems across all levels of abstraction. In
addition, we identify key decisions in empirical research beyond
taking on one perspective or the other. Overall, we aim to
present critical considerations that are necessary to define clearly
the conceptualization of goal conflict underlying the respective
research and to ensure that goal conflict is actually present in
empirical investigations, which, in turn, is necessary to develop
and test theory regarding the antecedents, mechanisms, and
immediate consequences of goal conflict.
PERSPECTIVES ON GOAL CONFLICTS
A Structure-Like Perspective
Goals direct rather than energize behavior (Elliot et al., 2002).
They can be defined as “internal representations of desired end-
states” (Austin andVancouver, 1996, p. 338) that are structured in
terms of means–end relations prototypically depicted in terms of
a pyramid (see Figure 1, each side represents a goal system; e.g.,
Sheldon and Kasser, 1995; Carver and Scheier, 2000; Kruglanski
et al., 2002). For example, in order to reach the higher-order
goal to have a career, subgoals may include (a) demonstrating
the ability to handle a high workload and (b) developing a new
business strategy. Means to these subgoal ends could then be (a)
complete task A, B, and C and (b) analyze sales figures.
Maybe the most significant continuum on which end states
can be organized is generality vs. specificity (e.g., Fries et al.,
2005; Lord et al., 2010). The most abstract level adheres to
general values, such as self-direction and security (e.g., Schwartz,
1992). These values cannot be reached in the sense of an
end state, but provide guidelines for individuals’ goal setting
(Fries et al., 2007). By contrast, on the most specific level, end
states refer to specific tasks or actions that individuals do to
accomplish their goals (down to the point of motor control; Lord
et al., 2010). These tasks and actions are referred to as means
people act out to attain a goal (Carver and Scheier, 1998). In
between these two extremes, different levels of abstraction have
been used as paradigms to study goal-directed behavior guided
by personal goals (e.g., possible selves; Markus and Nurius,
1986; aspirations; Sheldon and Kasser, 1995; life tasks; Cantor
et al., 1986; personal projects; Little, 1983; personal strivings;
Emmons, 1986; current concerns; Klinger, 1987; personal goals;
Riediger and Freund, 2004). In the present contribution, we
focus on these personal goals defined as idiographic, mid-
level goals that direct people’s course of life over a longer
period.
With the highest-order goal at the apex of the goal system,
all subgoals are supposed to serve to attain or at least approach
the highest-order goal. As long as the highest-order goals do
not contradict each other, a person’s goal systems should form
a coherent structure. However, sometimes people pursue goals
that are not derived from the highest-order goals, for example,
because they adopt goals from other people. These goals may
run counter to a person’s self-chosen personal goals (Sheldon
and Elliot, 1998) and may not be in accordance with the self ’s
core values, plans, and self-defining aspects (Sheldon and Kasser,
1995).
Making things even more complicated, pursuing exclusively
self-generated goals does not guarantee that all of these goals
are truly “personal.” According to Sheldon and Elliot (1998),
self-generated goals “can feel just as authoritarian as external
rules and constraints” (p. 546), when the reasons behind these
goals express a more externally controlled form of motivational
regulation (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Thus, the structure of
individuals’ goals is highly complex and hold the potential for
contradictions and friction between the goals.
Building on the concept of hierarchically structured goal
systems, Sheldon and Kasser (1995) distinguished two kinds
of coherences within and between goal systems, which, if
not fulfilled, holds the potential for goal conflict: Vertical
coherence occurs when subordinate goals are instrumental for
the attainment of superordinate goals. Accordingly, vertical
interference refers to situations in which individuals pursue goals
that are not, or not well, connected to any self-defining values.
By contrast, horizontal coherence describes facilitative relations
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FIGURE 1 | Structure of goals within goal systems [example: work vs. friends].
between goals that typically belong to different goal systems.
Thus, horizontal interference typically refers to instances of goal
conflict between goals on comparable levels of abstraction, which
will take center stage in our review.
A Process-Like Perspective
Having set a personal goal is not necessarily equivalent to
pursuing this goal. In many cases, there may be a substantial time
lag between goal setting, goal implementation, and successful
goal attainment. In order to understand the difficulties of
multiple-goal pursuit, it is useful to examine the various
sequential steps goal-directed behavior typically follows and
outline potential for goal conflicts along the way.
According to the Rubicon model of action phases (Gollwitzer,
1990; Heckhausen, 1991), goal-directed behavior breaks down
into four action phases and three transition steps, depicting
the prototypical process of single-goal pursuit within a self-
regulation cycle (cf. Boekaerts et al., 2000; Vohs and Baumeister,
2004; Zimmerman, 2008, see Figure 2).
In the first, pre-decisional phase, individuals choose which
of their several possible goals they prefer to pursue (choose
action). Decisions such as these are considered to follow the
mechanism of modern expectancy-value theories (e.g., Wigfield
and Eccles, 2000). The more likely the successful attainment of
a possible goal and the higher the value attributed to it, the
higher its preference. The pre-decisional phase is the one in
which the notion of conflicting goals becomes apparent. Here,
the competition between one’s several personal goals takes place
when, for example, school and leisure goals are simultaneously
activated (Fries et al., 2008; Grund et al., 2014) or work-related
goals compete with private life goals (Eby et al., 2005).
FIGURE 2 | Process model of goal-directed action [example: single-goal
perspective]. This figure merges the linear model of action phases (Gollwitzer,
1990; Heckhausen, 1991) and cyclical models of self-regulation (e.g.,
Zimmerman, 2008) to reflect the ongoing stream of individuals’ actions.
A deliberate goal intention in terms of a feeling of
determination or commitment with regard to the desired end
state characterizes the transition to the second, pre-actional phase
(plan action). Once the choice to realize a particular action is
made, one has crossed the Rubicon (i.e., literally, there is no way
back). In the planning phase, goal-related thoughts and feelings
are directly related to action (i.e., identify strategies to attain a
goal, choose means). The more specific these plans, the higher
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the likelihood of successful goal attainment (Gollwitzer, 1999).
In planning goal pursuit, limited resources or incompatible goal
attainment strategies may become salient if the individual takes
competing means attached to different goal system into account.
The next transition is characterized by the initiation or onset
of action (act). Hence, in phase three, individuals act according to
their plans and try to reduce the discrepancy between the current
status quo and the desired end state. According to the Rubicon
model, the clear-cut decision for one action goal (presumably
the higher valued, more feasible alternative at a given moment),
the inception of a focal goal intention, and the devaluation of
alternative goals, enables people to pursue one goal without being
affected by (potentially conflicting) alternative goals (Gollwitzer,
1990; Shah et al., 2002; Fishbach et al., 2010; Unsworth et al.,
2014). However, recent research on motivational interference has
demonstrated that goal conflict may pose difficulties for people
attempting to stick to their plans, or may distract them and
cause them to doubt even after having decided on a focal goal
(Fries et al., 2008; Grund et al., 2015). Research on motivational
interference has revealed negative effects of conflicting goals
on individuals’ experience and performance, even when the
dismissed alternatives are only mentally present and no actual
switching has occurred (Fries et al., 2008).
The last transition refers to the achievement of the goal.
After a person has reached a designated goal, s/he evaluates
in the last, post-actional phase, whether the actual outcome
state matches the desired and expected outcome state (evaluate
action). Here, the competition between several goals may become
vital again. Thus, when individuals evaluate their actions, they
may realize that they have sacrificed one goal in favor of another
without intending to do so, which may have a range of cognitive,
affective, and/or behavioral consequences. For example, people
may regret their actions or delve in counterfactual thinking
(Gilovich and Medvec, 1995; Kuhnle and Sinclair, 2011). In
addition, (potential) failure to attain (or approach) one of the
goals should shift back to higher-level goals, and people may
have to disengage from or revise a goal, or draw consequences
for future action (Kehr, 2003). Future pre-decisional and pre-
actional considerations may be derived out of the concluded
goal-pursuit attempt.
Reconciling Both Perspectives into an
Integrative Framework for Thought
Our key proposition is that conceptualizations of goal conflict
need to consider both a structure-like and a process-like
perspective simultaneously. Hence, drawing on higher-order
(personal) goals needs to consider necessary subgoals and means
from the process of goal pursuit to identify goal conflict. In turn,
drawing on competing means during the process of goal pursuit
needs to consider the anchoring of these means in superordinate
subgoals of the respective personal goal and/or the personal
goal itself. Considering both perspectives challenges the implicit
assumption that goal conflict manifests itself primarily as same-
level conflict.
To integrate the two perspectives outlined above, we will
theoretically trace the path of goal conflict through levels of
abstraction and action phases. The potential for goal conflict is
set up within the higher-order goal structures, when one has
too many goals that are drawing on limited resources, or when
one sets goals that are attached to incompatible goal attainment
strategies or end states. At this stage, if individuals are already
planning ahead across levels of abstraction, they may become
aware that they do not have the resources to pursue either goal,
or that the end states are incompatible. Therefore, they may feel
blocked because they do not know what to do, or commitment
for each goal may be reduced.
After choosing a goal to pursue, this goal will be activated
and translated into means to act out. At this level, goal conflict
likely becomes salient in individuals’ minds because individuals
actually have to deal with competing means and goals when
attempting to move forward with their action. If individuals
choose one particular goal to pursue and continue with their
actions, they may still experience motivational interference.
Depending on one’s decisions and actions, goal conflict may affect
higher levels of the relevant goal systems during and/or after goal
pursuit if individuals reflect on the implications of their actions
for their personal goals. For example, realizing that both goals
cannot be attained, individuals may have to disengage from or
change a goal. In each phase, individuals may refer back to higher
levels of their goals to assure themselves of the goals’ relevance
and/or to try to find a solution.
Thus, goal conflict detected in the structure of a person’s
goals may, but does not necessarily, affect his or her actions
(i.e., become action-relevant). That is to say, individuals may
carry with them goal conflict without being bothered. As long
as individuals do not actually try to pursue both (all) conflicting
goals at the same time, they may simply not notice interfering
goal interrelations. By contrast, choosing a goal and planning
one’s action may be heavily impaired by goal conflicts. Here, goal
conflict touches the level of action, and individuals become aware
of goal conflict they may not have noticed before because they
have not yet tried to attain these goals.
As can be seen in Figure 1, on an abstract level, the higher-
order goals of being a good friend and being successful at work
do not necessarily conflict with each other. The same can be true
for midlevel goals, such as to develop a new business strategy
and stay in touch. However, on the specific-level of current
action, a person may not have the time to pursue work-related
and social goals alike. In addition, two means may essentially
come into conflict even though they may be instrumental for
the same midlevel goal (e.g., “going to Jane’s party” and “helping
Tom move” are both instrumental for “staying in touch with
friends”). These instances are likely to represent action-relevant
resource goal conflict due to a lack of time, money, or energy.
Similarly, inherent conflict probably manifests itself on the
specific-level of a self-regulation hierarchy and becomes action-
relevant because opposing standards for self-regulation most
likely become operant with specific means-end relations. For
example, a manager may try to be friends with his or her staff
while at the same time evaluate their performance.
In sum, (antecedents of) goal conflict established on higher
levels of abstraction may impact individuals’ actions and
performance on the level of means, whereas (consequences of)
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goal conflict on the level of means may feedback to higher levels
of abstraction and impair individuals’ well-being and actions in
the future. A structure-like and a process-like perspective (and
research) on goal conflict thus differ by the consideration vs.
exclusion of the level of abstraction involved in the conflict
under investigation. Therefore, an integrated perspective is better
suited to establish a full account of the conceptualization of
goal conflicts, which may be located on and across all levels of
abstractions and action phases.
When Is a Goal Conflict a Goal Conflict?
Answers from an Integrative Perspective
on Goal Conflict
Returning to the definition of goal conflict cited in the
introduction—“a goal that a person wishes to accomplish
interferes with the attainment of at least one other goal that
the individual simultaneously wishes to accomplish” (Emmons
et al., 1993, p. 531)—we may say that this definition is valid from
both perspectives. Attempting to translate this definition into a
watertight operationalization to measure personal goal conflict
from one perspective or the other is, however, challenging, and
may differ depending on the perspective we take.
First, looking at goal conflict through structure-like glasses
calls for an analytic approach. Goal structures would need
to be analyzed against the background of the individual’s
resources to evaluate whether the goal systems are consistent
within themselves, consistent across one another, and attainable
given the resources available. Thus, taking on a structure-
like perspective in empirical research would need access to
individuals’ goal structures by, for example, asking them (but see
Kruglanski et al., 2002, for an experimental approach).
From a process-like perspective, the definition requires an
action-relevant goal conflict that is noticeable at least in a person’s
mind if taken literally (i.e., “interferes” as present tense, for
example, by sorting through conflicting goals to choose one
goal that enters the planning phase, by switching tasks or by
experiencing motivational interference). Unfortunately, action-
relevance is hardly defined in experiential terms, which makes
it difficult to pinpoint action-relevant goal conflict based on
specific experiential instances. Action-relevance may emerge in
different andmore or less obvious forms in terms of interruptions
of a person’s course of action. For example, a rather obvious
experiential instance of action-relevant goal conflict may lead
a person to switch between actions, whereas a less obvious
experiential instancemay lead him or her to “only” shift resources
from one goal to another, or to deliberately think about how he or
she can reach both goals. Because individuals dispose of various
strategies to deal with potentially conflicting goals, however, they
have many ways to prevent a goal conflict from taking negative
effect on their actions. Hence, defining what shall be considered
as goal conflict and what shall not (yet) constitute goal conflict
will be necessary.
To identify potential experiential instances indicating goal
conflict, a discussion along the action phases may be helpful.
In particular, defining which action phase a goal conflict must
have reached to fulfill its definition is important. For example,
rumination or difficulty to decide on a focal goal may or may
not be considered as a goal conflict. One may argue against
recognition of rumination as a goal conflict because the action
has not yet started. Conversely, however, one may argue in favor
of recognition as a goal conflict because rumination may hinder
individuals from starting an action, thereby impairing the course
of action.
During the action phase, goals may be pursued and attained
in sequence—i.e., act on and attain goal A first, and then
turn to goal B—so that limited resources will not be overused.
More recent descriptions of the Rubicon model also allow for
suspending and resuming goal-pursuit while pursuing another
goal in the meantime (Kleinbeck, 2009). Thus, individuals
may switch between goals in terms of their regular course
of action, for example, because the active goal depends on
attaining another goal first, or because the opportunity to pursue
another goal is more favorable than sticking to the active goal.
When individuals stick to one goal, they may still experience
motivational interference (Grund et al., 2014). In addition,
individuals may be able to implement multifinal means related
to two or more goals they want to pursue (cf., Fishbach and
Ferguson, 2007; Köpetz et al., 2011). Finally, in some cases, a
rethinking of one’s goals and priorities, or even disengagement
from a goal (Brandstätter and Schüler, 2013), would be the logical
consequence of goal conflict because goal attainment may be
impossible. Hence, if an individual uses any of these strategies
to pursue potentially conflicting goals and, thereby, succeeds
in not having their actions impaired by the goal conflict, one
could say that he or she did not have a goal conflict. However,
one could also say that individuals had to spend energy on
regulating their course of action to avoid (further) impairment
of their course of action by these (potentially) conflicting goals,
which may qualify as goal conflict. In other words, if a person
anticipates goal conflict and takes precautions to prevent this
goal conflict from becoming action-relevant (i.e., by changing the
schedule for goal attainment), did he or she have goal conflict at
all? It is arguable—and subject to definition—whether situations
in which individuals may go on with their course of action
through successful self-regulation or employment of multifinal
means actually fulfill the definition of goal conflict. Overall,
this discussion comes down to the question of what kind of
interruptions qualify as indicators of goal conflict.
As is evident from these considerations, research on goal
conflict needs a careful definition of goal conflict as a research
objective, and an equally careful operationalization. From an
integrative perspective, we would like to suggest developing
different, but related, conceptualizations, for example, goal
conflict in a narrow and in a broad sense. A narrow sense could
focus on goal conflict that has reached the level of action, whereas
a broad sense could encompass any—even small and merely
mentally represented—interruptions of one’s course of action.
With respect to goal conflict research, different
conceptualizations of goal conflict derived from the two
perspectives—roughly speaking, as a non-action-relevant
goal conflict concluded from one’s goal structure or as an
action-relevant goal conflict indicated by a specific experiential
instance—determine the processes and mechanisms that may
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lead to goal conflict formation (i.e., its antecedents) and explain
how goal conflict affects individuals’ regulatory effectiveness
and well-being (i.e., its consequences). To establish a sound
theoretical and empirical account of goal conflict and produce
comparable study designs, some common ground would be
helpful. In the following, we will therefore investigate existing
empirical approaches to the study of goal conflict to see
which perspective on goal conflict is prevalent in empirical
studies and how existing theoretical conceptualizations and
empirical approaches may be used systematically to further
our understanding of goal conflict. Building on the integrated
perspective, we will then discuss what needs to be taken into
consideration in the design of empirical studies to illuminate
antecedents and consequences of goal conflict, which constitute
key questions within goal conflict research.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN
EXISTING RESEARCH ON GOAL
CONFLICT
To gain an overview of existing empirical research on goal
conflict, we conducted a systematic literature review covering
research on goal conflict from 1985 to 2015 in the PsycInfo
database. We chose 1985 as a starting point because research
on idiographic, mid-level personal goals gained increased
importance at the beginning of the 1980s, producing several
seminal works (e.g., Little, 1983; Emmons, 1986; Klinger, 1987).
We searched for publications with the keyword “goal conflict”
and limited the results to peer-reviewed academic journal articles
in English with goals, conflict, and empirical study as major
subjects. We found 161 articles matching these criteria. Next, we
scanned all abstracts to determine whether the study addressed
naturally occurring intraindividual goal conflict between two or
more personal goals. Hence, we excluded studies on interpersonal
goal conflict, organizational conflict, conflict between pursuit vs.
disengagement regarding a single goal, cognitive conflict between
incompatible tasks, and non-conscious goal conflict. Following
these guidelines, 35 articles remained in our final review sample
and were inspected in more detail (see references highlighted by
an asterisk).
Overall, we found manifold approaches for assessing and
investigating goal conflict. Some differences were quite obvious,
whereas other were rather subtle. To provide a structured
presentation of our essential findings, we summarize three key
decisions in goal conflict research in the following chapters. In
principle, the different approaches to the study of goal conflict
may be combined in any way. In the literature, however, some
combinations appear more often than others. In the following
sections, we will examine these empirical approaches in more
detail.
Measuring Goal Conflict from a
Structure-Like vs. a Process-Like
Perspective
Conceptualizing goal conflict from a structure-like vs. a
process-like perspective leads to major differences in its
operationalization and, thus, the interpretation of empirical
findings. A structure-like perspective prototypically leads
to measuring goal conflict as a cognitive construct (i.e.,
mental representations of goal conflict), whereas a process-
like perspective would lead to measuring goal conflict as
an experiential instance (i.e., recollections of a person’s
past or anticipations of his or her future experiences).
Along this distinction, empirical approaches to capturing
participants’ goal conflicts may rely on abstract ratings,
indicating cognitive constructs (“one goal striving is seen
[. . . ] as interfering with the achievement of other strivings”;
Emmons and King, 1988, p. 1,041, italics by authors), or tap
participants’ experience presumably related to goal conflict
(“pin down people’s experiences when actually facing a
particular goal conflict”; Gorges et al., 2014, p. 478, italics
by authors).
Taking on a structural perspective, many researchers ask
participants to rate the extent of conflict (or interference)
between two goals (Emmons and King, 1988; Sheldon, 1995;
Kehr, 2003; Stangier et al., 2007; Wiese and Salmela-Aro, 2008;
Kelly et al., 2011; Boudreaux and Ozer, 2013). A seminal study
by Emmons and King (1988) draws on judgements of how
one goal affects the attainment of another goal (“Does being
successful in this striving have a helpful, a harmful, or no effect
at all on the other striving?” p. 1,042) regarding several goal
interrelations. Similarly, Kehr (2003) had participants report
their cognitive representation of goal interrelations, asking
“Does the pursuit of this goal support or inhibit the other
goal, or does it have no effect on it?” (p. 199). Still using
a cognitive construct approach, but framing the question a
bit differently, participants in Boersma et al.’s (2006) study
indicated their agreement to items such as “Pursuing this goal
will be at the expense of other important goals I want to
achieve” (p. 931), reflecting a conceptualization of goal conflict
as a property of one (or more) goals (see section Measuring
Goal Conflict Based on Goal Interrelations vs. Single-Goal
Properties).
Taking a different avenue, researchers who are interested
in investigating action-relevant goal conflict typically try to
pinpoint a goal conflict that is marked by a particular
experience, such as an interruption of one’s course of action
(Gorges et al., 2014), pose more or less open questions
(Lee et al., 1991; Berrios et al., 2015), or refer to a
specific affect presumably related to goal conflict (Suliman
and Abdulla, 2005; Bailis et al., 2011). Measuring goal conflict
as an experiential instance, however, is quite a challenge
when the experience—and thereby the assessment of goal
conflict—is meant to be unrelated to potentially negative
effects of goal conflict, which oftentimes is the relation under
investigation.
Methodological approaches to tapping participants’ factual
experiences encompass direct and indirect questioning strategies.
For example, Berrios et al. (2015, p. 758) asked participants to
“recall as vividly as possible a recent conflicting goals event”
and provided “a specific definition of goal conflict and some
examples.” By contrast, Gorges et al. (2014) drew on the concept
of motivational interference as an indicator of goal conflict,
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asking participants “to remember a situation in which they felt
torn between two activities within the last couple of weeks”
(p. 478). Next, participants may be asked to report general
ratings of how much goal conflict they experience (e.g., “To
what extent did one goal have harmful effects on the other
goal?” Berrios et al., 2015, p. 758; Kuhnle et al., 2010) and/or
ratings of items that reflect experiences associated with goal
conflict (Zaleski, 1987; Lee et al., 1991; Gebhardt and Maes, 1998;
Slocum et al., 2002; Suliman and Abdulla, 2005; Gorges et al.,
2014).
Measuring Goal Conflict Based on Goal
Interrelations vs. Single-Goal Properties
Seen from a different angle, empirical research differs in
its conceptualization as a specific goal interrelation vs. a
characteristic attached to the goal. Drawing on the idea of
horizontal interference within goal structures, Emmons and King
(1988) have introduced an idiographic-nomothetic goal conflict
assessment in terms of a matrix. Assuming that goal conflict
primarily occurs on lower rather than higher levels of abstraction,
empirical approaches to elicit personal goals and, subsequently,
goal conflict, typically focus on midlevel goal concepts, such
as personal strivings (e.g., Emmons and King, 1988; Riediger,
2007). Following Emmons and King (1988), many studies take
into account several goal interrelations and their potential for
goal conflict. Hence, participants first list the goals they are
currently striving to attain (Michalak et al., 2004). Next, using
these goals as columns and lines—thereby spanning a matrix
(e.g., Emmons, 1986)—participants evaluate the interrelation
of each pair of goals. Goal interrelations may be supportive
(i.e., attainment of goal A facilitates attainment of goal B),
indicated by positive values; conflictive (i.e., attainment of goal
A interferes with attainment of goal B), indicated by negative
values; or neutral, indicated by zero. Finally, the sum of adding
up all the values reflects participants’ overall extent of goal
conflict. More precisely, the final score represents the weighted
sum of goal conflict counterbalanced by facilitative intergoal
relations. Next, the overall extent of goal conflict (i.e., the index)
is related to outcome variables at more general levels, such
as affective well-being (Emmons and King, 1988; Boudreaux
and Ozer, 2013), and job and family satisfaction (Wiese and
Salmela-Aro, 2008). This procedure has been used widely in
goal conflict research focusing on a range of goal interrelations
(Sheldon, 1995; Kehr, 2003; Hardy et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2011;
Presseau et al., 2015), or on one particular goal interrelation
(Locke et al., 1994; Karoly and Ruehlman, 1996; Etkin et al.,
2015).
Unlike approaches based on goal interrelation, other authors
focus on single goals and conceptualize goal conflict as a goal
property (Cantor et al., 1992; Boersma et al., 2006; Li and Chan,
2008; Hardy et al., 2011). Thus, the assessment of goal conflict
is tied to participants reporting on goal properties using items
such as “How much conflict does working on this task engender
in your life?” (Cantor et al., 1992, p. 646). These items may refer
to the actual goal conflict presumably caused by the goal or the
potential for goal conflict, respectively.
Measuring Resource vs. Inherent Goal
Conflict
Despite fundamental conceptual differences between resource
goal conflict and inherent goal conflicts, which may well be
relevant for goal conflict formation and consequences, most
studies do not specify which type of goal conflict they ask for
(e.g., Emmons and King, 1988). If they do, the type of goal
conflict to be reported—i.e., resource conflicts, inherent conflicts,
or both—is elicited by prescribing the goal conflict in question or
by using specific instructions to trigger the specific type of goal
conflict. As a prominent example of research on resource goal
conflict, Locke et al. (1994) conducted a study with participants
who typically have limited resources but unlimited goals to
achieve (i.e., researchers having research and teaching duties).
Similarly, Slocum et al. (2002) focused on sales people who face
resource goal conflict due to additional sales goals. Hence, these
studies imply that they focus on resource goal conflict via the
setting of the study. A more explicit approach has been followed
by Gorges et al. (2014), who have suggested a certain type of
goal conflict in their instruction. Their participants were junior
scientists who have been introduced to the problem of limited
time resources (“. . . time resources for the realization of these
numerous intentions are naturally limited. This may lead to
conflicts, e.g., should I prepare my lecture today, or continue to
write my research paper, or participate in the faculty assembly,”
p. 478). Next, participants were asked to report a recent conflict
along these lines. Hence, the instruction in this study focuses
on resource goal conflict without using this particular technical
term.
Contrasting numerous studies on resource goal conflicts,
research on inherent goal conflict is scarce. From our sample,
only five studies explicitly address inherent goal conflict as
distinguished from resource goals conflict. Most studies tap
inherent goal conflict by prescribing at least one goal (intelligence
vs. romance goals of women; Park et al., 2011); drinking
alcohol but not driving while being drunk (Liourta and van
Empelen, 2008); saving vs. spending money (Loibl, 2009);
stopping smoking (McKeeman and Karoly, 1991), and asking
for its interrelations with other goals or the extent of its conflict
with other goals in general. It is striking that many of these
studies focus on at least one avoidance goal. Maybe avoidance
goals many a time do not require resources, such as time or
money, and, therefore, are more likely to be part of an inherent
goal conflict. Nevertheless, a broad conceptualization of goal
conflict would acknowledge the self-regulating energy required
to avoid, for example, smoking as a resource as well (Muraven
and Baumeister, 2000). Hence, avoidance goals can be part of
resource goal conflict, and ceasing smoking, for example, may
not be part of an inherent goal conflict after all. Only one
study in our sample used the distinction between resource and
inherent goal conflict on self-generated goals based on a matrix
(Segerstrom and Solberg Nes, 2006), but used trained raters to
establish the difference between the two types of goal conflict.
Apparently, the distinction between the two types of goal conflict
is quite complex, which makes it difficult to ask participants to
distinguish between them.
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM REVIEWING
CURRENT APPROACHES TO ASSESS
GOAL CONFLICT
Conceptualizing Goal Conflict as a
Cognitive Construct vs. an Experiential
Instance
Taking on a structure-like perspective on goal conflict and,
consequently, using cognitive construal as an empirical approach
to measure goal conflict goes along with certain presuppositions
that should be clear to researchers and readers alike. Most
importantly, the basic assumption is that goal conflict is
what people report as goal conflict and, therefore, is a
highly suggestible and potentially malleable construct. In fact,
perceiving—and consequently reporting—goal conflict may
depend on a range of personal and contextual factors. With
respect to personal factors, Freitas et al. (2009) asked participants
for their perceived goal conflict, but deliberately manipulated the
level on which participants’ elicited personal goals by a preceding
task. As expected, reporting interfering goal interrelations
depends on the structural level of goals: participants reported
more goal conflict if they had generated personal goals from a
lower structural level. Segerstrom and Solberg-Nes’ (2006) work
on the role of optimism represents another study challenging
the validity of direct judgements of goal conflict: Independent
raters evaluated conflict between personal goals reported by
the participants. The extent of conflict was significantly related
to participants’ optimism. With respect to contextual factors,
participants’ current situation or recent experiences may affect
their judgement of goal interrelations. For example, after a
particularly stressful week at work, resource goal conflict may be
more salient than usual.
The perception of goal conflict may also be influenced by
the goals’ properties. Goals can be described in more detail in
terms of their goal properties (cf. Austin and Vancouver, 1996)
and their underlying motivation (e.g., Sheldon and Elliot, 1999).
As goal properties—such as temporal range, goal commitment,
goal attainability, and goal self-concordance—have been shown
to affect single goal processes, they likely play a critical role in
multiple-goal pursuit in the case of goal conflict as well. For
example, goal self-concordance has been found to affect whether
people experience multiple-goal pursuit as psychological strain
vs. challenge (Senécal et al., 2001; Gorges et al., 2014). Hence,
feelings of interference may vary according to the extent to which
goals are pursued with self-determined motivation (Senécal et al.,
2003; Ratelle et al., 2005; Grund, 2013). This may lead to biased
results when participants report on how many goal conflicts, or
how much overall goal conflict they perceive.
One may argue that the subjectively perceived extent of
goal conflict is what affects people’s actions and well-being
and, therefore, is a reasonable indicator of goal conflict.
From this perspective, however, finding valid evidence through
methodological approaches that require participants to carefully
assess many of their goal interrelations and literally search for
conflict within their goal structure may be difficult because such
procedures will probably increase the salience of goal conflict.
In addition, the goal conflict reported may mix action-relevant
and non-action-relevant goal conflict. In fact, using a cognitive
judgement approach likely attracts attention to goal conflict
existing “only” in people’s mind, which may not become action-
relevant in the near future (if at all), and, thereby, may have “fake”
negative effects on people’s well-being. Thus, conceptualizing
goal conflict as a cognitive construct and, consequently, asking
participants to construct these goal conflicts for the study could
result in methodological artefacts.
Taking on a process-like perspective of goal conflict, however,
is anything but an easy solution to these measurement problems.
Studies using experiential instances to assess goal conflict mostly
rely on feelings of interference or conflict to evaluate the existence
and the extent of individuals’ goal conflict. Using the effect of
a goal conflict on individuals’ experience as an indicator of its
existence obviously is problematic. If the experiential instance is
intertwined with possible effects of goal conflict, disentangling
existence and effect of goal conflict is difficult, if at all possible.
Hence, by considering (only) negative affect as an indicator of
goal conflict (e.g., rating frustration; Suliman and Abdulla, 2005;
rating negative effects on other valued goals; Slocum et al., 2002),
the cart is put before the horse. Measuring goal conflict based
on its consequences precludes insights into how goal conflicts
become effective, and blurs conceptual clarity of goal conflict,
such as its consequences and, probably, its antecedents.
To delineate existence and effects of goal conflict, experiential
instances of goal conflict should be carefully distinguished from
potential consequences of goal conflict. The major challenge,
however, is that we do not know for sure which more or
less neutral experiential instances may indicate goal conflict.
In an attempt to minimize intermixture of existence and
effect, Gorges et al. (2014, p. 478) took recourse to the
phenomenon of motivational interference when they asked
individuals to “think back to the last couple of weeks and
try to remember a particular situation in which you ‘felt torn’
between two intentions” in order to pinpoint one particular
goal conflict that had an effect on individuals’ actions. This
approach may open a potential avenue for designing experiential
instances in empirical research. Nevertheless, approaches based
on experiential instances typically do not take into account that
all goals are embedded in a complex structure of goal systems.
Consequently, which goals (i.e., on which level, belonging to
which goal systems) actually cause the conflict that impairs action
may remain unclear.
Focusing on Goal Interrelations vs. Single
Goal Properties
Following the conceptualization of goal conflict as an interfering
relation between two goals (Emmons et al., 1993), idiographic-
nomothetic approaches that elicit personal goals and have
participants judge their interrelations come very close to
theoretical assumptions. From this viewpoint, focusing on goal
interrelation(s) apparently is more precise than asking for
conflict in terms of a single goal property. In addition, the
latter makes great demands on participants’ ability to analyze
and reflect their goal, its embeddedness in goal structures,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2011
Gorges and Grund Intraindividual Goal Conflict
and consequences of goal pursuit. Hence, goal conflict should
generally be assessed based on goal interrelations rather than goal
properties.
Reviewing empirical studies using the goal interrelations
approach, however, revealed that many of them did not focus
on a single goal conflict. Rather, they focus on a summary of
participants’ current or future goal conflicts, which does not
seem apt to investigate antecedents and consequences of goal
conflict in much detail. The major reason for this evaluation
is ambiguity in assigning effects to a particular goal conflict
involving specific goals. Hence, an overall goal conflict index
would reveal if only one of the goal conflicts was responsible for
negative effects whereas the others have neutral or even positive
consequences. Because theory and empirical findings suggest that
some goal conflicts may be more detrimental than others (Gorges
et al., 2014), pooling goal conflict into one variable blurs the
contribution of single goal conflicts to overall effects.
Another challenge regarding the methodological procedure
of a goal matrix is that instructions typically aim at eliciting
people’s goals from only one level, but cannot ensure that all
reported goals actually are on the same level of abstraction.
In fact, the matrix approach would not detect if all facilitative
goals belonged to one superordinate goal. Hence, both the
definition of goal conflict as the pursuit of one goal impairing
attainment of the other goal, and its operationalization, appears
rather unspecific. In addition, the potential inducement of
negative effects by the methodology and the susceptibility
to bias—not least because of moderators such as personal
dispositions or goal properties—constitute serious threats
to the validity of empirical results. Nevertheless, positive
aspects of the matrix approach include its pioneering
contributions to research on goal conflict and its ability
to tap individuals’ diverse, idiographic goals and goal
interrelations.
Resource Goal Conflict vs. Inherent Goal
Conflict
The key decision resource goal conflict vs. inherent goal
conflict seems closely related to theoretical underpinnings of
a study. Our review revealed a preponderance of studies on
resource goal conflict, which is, however, mostly implicit.
Given the sheer number of goals individuals pursue and the
natural tendency to form a coherent goal structure (Little,
1983), the literature may reflect the stronger prevalence of
resource goal conflict compared to inherent goal conflicts.
Nevertheless, assuming that inherent goal conflict occurs when
individuals take on goals set by other individuals (or goals
that are at least shaped by expectations of significant others)
—e.g., at work, within families—this type of goal conflict
should be very relevant for individuals’ lives as well. Hence,
investigating inherent goal conflict in its own right and
comparing antecedents, experiential instances, and consequences
to resource goal conflict is an important yet insufficiently engaged
task.
Contexts in which both resource and inherent goal conflict
occur may be particularly fruitful to the study of inherent
goal conflict. In Germany, for example, teachers’ workplace
is considered as one which generates resource goal conflict
and inherent goal conflicts. More specifically, teachers typically
have to attend to various tasks prior to, during, and after
classes (cf. Grund et al., 2016). In addition, teachers pursue
fundamental professional goals that are incompatible with one
another, known as antinomies (e.g., promoting autonomous
actions in a heteronomous environment; Helsper, 1996). Initial
steps toward assessing resource goal conflict and inherent goal
conflict, each in its own right, have recently been taken by
Neumann et al. (unpublished manuscript).
Even though we know little about antecedents of goal conflict,
we may assume that resource goal conflict primarily challenges
individuals’ self-regulation competence. By contrast, it may not
constitute a primarily logistic problem of resource allocation.
Instead, inherent conflict refers to intrapsychic frictions in the
sense of self-discordance (cf. Sheldon and Kasser, 1995), and,
therefore, may be especially pivotal for psychological well-being.
Hence, we may assume that both antecedents and consequences
differ depending on the type of goal conflict. The type of goal
conflict may be a moderator, or the types may even constitute
distinct theoretical constructs. Either way, researchers need to
address both types of goal conflict in their own right.
Further Options in the Study of Goal
Conflict
Beyond the three key decisions, we identified a number of further
options researchers can choose when studying goal conflict.
As a subtle but still important difference, empirical studies
on goal conflict vary in the tense used in their instructions.
The abovementioned studies on goal interrelations typically ask
participants to list personal goals they are currently striving to
attain and to rate the extent of goal conflict (Emmons and King,
1988). By contrast, some researchers used past tense wording
to elicit goals (or activities) that participants have been trying
to attain in the recent past and for which they rate how much
these goals have been conflicting (Perring et al., 1988; McKeeman
and Karoly, 1991). Although, this procedure does not instruct
participants to deliberately focus on goal conflict that has affected
their actions, referring to the past may be more likely to tap
action-relevant goal conflict.
Beyond that, some authors were interested in very specific
conflicts involving one particular goal. In such cases, the goal
of interest—for example, physical exercise—has been prescribed
during the study and related to a second self-reported personal
goal (e.g., Carraro and Gaudreau, 2015). Taking a different
approach, other studies lack a direct assessment of (the existence
or extent of) goal conflict. Instead, these studies rely on the
existence of goal conflict solely inferred from contextual factors
such as being in a specific situation (e.g., reporting strong
physical exercise and academic goals, Bailis et al., 2011; change
of residence; Segerstrom, 2001, 2006) or reporting certain
characteristics theoretically associated with goal conflict (e.g.,
obsessive passion; Bélanger et al., 2013; see also Loibl, 2009;
Park et al., 2011). We consider these requirements regarding the
presence of goal conflict rather lax.
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Requirements of Integrating Perspectives
on Personal Goal Conflict
The complexity of goal conflict requires a careful definition of
goal conflict as a research objective, and a close look at research
findings, to figure out which aspect of goal conflict has actually
been addressed in the literature or will be addressed in the
respective study. Integrating a structure-like and a process-like
perspective should foremost be done by outlining an integrated
conceptualization of goal conflict as a basis for empirical research
addressing goal conflict. In particular, we need to address
conflicting goal interrelations across levels of abstraction that
fuse a structure-like and a process-like perspective. For example,
from a structure-like perspective, goal conflict may arise when
people set goals that are not in line with the goals they already
have. Considering the process-like perspective as well, we need
to ask to what extent people (would need to) anticipate means
to attain their goals, foresee their future goal-directed behaviors,
and predict their resources, to (be able to) decide whether a new
goal will cause conflict. In this regard, personal characteristics
such as ability to and motivation for complex and reflective
thinking may play an important role.
Many studies taking on a process-like perspective have
linked the experience of personal goal conflict to behavioral
and/or experiential consequences, whereas they mostly lack
the link between processes on an action-level to processes
located on higher levels of abstraction that occur before or
after taking action. Thus, research investigating action-relevant
goal conflict often neglects the specific structure behind the
conflicting goals, where goal conflict may be rooted. In addition,
a broad conceptualization of goal conflict (see section When is
a Goal Conflict a Goal Conflict? Answers From an Integrative
Perspective on Goal Conflict) from a process-like perspective
will probably entail presuppositions such as a person’s ability for
self-regulation as well as his or her ability to direct and regulate
both cognition and emotion. Overall, a conceptualization of goal
conflict based on an integrative perspective may clarify how goal
conflicts emerge from multiple-goal pursuit.
In section Perspectives on Goal Conflicts, we have reviewed
several ways in which a goal conflict may affect individuals’
thoughts and actions. Each way in and of itself may be perceived
by a person as no big deal, as a minor or major hassle, or as
a catastrophe. For example, goal conflict that does not (yet)
affect actions may be experienced quite differently—or not as
negatively—compared to action-relevant goal conflict. Some
individuals may be adversely affected by goal conflict at any stage
due to their tendency to ruminate, whereas others simply do not
worry about things that are not yet reality (cf. Brosschot and
Thayer, 2004). Experiencing goal conflict with a goal one is hardly
committed to may be resolved easily by disengaging from the
goal, whereas a conflict between two highly valued goals may
seriously impair a person’s well-being. Thus, we would expect
a complex interplay between the goal conflict and situational
and personal characteristics that determine how individuals
experience and react to goal conflict. Therefore, we need to
make a greater effort to conceptualize (andmeasure) goal conflict
independent of its immediate consequences on experience and
behavior.
Conceptualizing personal goal conflict as set within multiple
goal systems, of which every goal system encompasses multiple
levels, leads to two immediate requirements for future research
on personal goal conflict:
1. Consideration of levels of abstraction and action phases in the
conceptualization of goal conflict and, thereby.
2. Consideration of interactions across levels of abstraction
between goal systems and goal-pursuit (i.e., how goals in a
multiple goal-pursuit context are broken down to means and
how goal systems may conflict across levels).
Methodological Implications: Three Key
Decisions for Empirical Research on
Personal Goal Conflict
An integrative perspective should scrutinize the potential overlap
of empirical approaches to the study of goal conflict favoring one
perspective or the other, and attend to goal/mean conflict across
levels of abstraction and in differing action phases. To handle this
research objective, we suggest empirical studies combining both
perspectives and related methodological approaches. This could
be done in several ways, some of which we will outline in the
following.
With respect to goal conflict as cognitive constructs,
researchers should provide detailed instruction to help
participants judge their goal interrelations. Maybe such
instructions will use experiential instances to help participants
identify goal conflict. With respect to experiential instances
of goal conflict, a discussion of experiential indicators of goal
conflict—for example, motivational interference (Fries et al.,
2008; Grund et al., 2015), hesitation, or extensive rumination
about one’s goals—is needed to find a sound basis for empirical
operationalization. On these grounds, empirical studies may
reveal some overlap of the perspectives and may help find
indicators of goal conflict, insight into moderators that affect
individuals’ perception and experience of goal conflict (e.g., goal
properties, resource vs. inherent goal conflict), and ways to assess
goal conflict.
To disentangle structural and procedural aspects of goal
conflict, studies could combine goal conflict assessments based
on cognitive constructs and experiential instances and, thereby,
investigate interrelations of and reciprocal effects between goal
conflict on different levels of abstraction and in different action
phases, respectively. For example, participants may be asked
to report cognitions about goal conflict and then track their
actions and experience over the course of 1 or 2 weeks to
report situations in which initially detected goal conflict actually
impairs actions and—potentially—experiences. Further, after
having experienced action-relevant goal conflict, participants
should report on consequences for their current goal systems, for
example, whether they have changed or disengaged from goals.
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A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology
appears apt to accommodate the complexity of goal conflict as
well as possible.
Against this background and drawing on our review of the
literature in section Methodological Approaches in Existing
Research on Goal Conflict, three key decisions need to be
seriously addressed, and interpretation of the results should be
done in light of these key decisions and their related theoretical
backgrounds.
1. The validity of assessing goal conflict as a cognitive construct
and the choice of experiential instances indicating goal
conflict need deliberate and more detailed methodological
investigation.
2. An integrative perspective emphasizes that goal conflict
occurs in goal interrelations. Hence, goal conflict
should be assessed based on goal interrelations, whereas
conceptualizations of conflict as attached to a single goal do
not appear appropriate to reflect goal conflict.
3. The type of goal conflict needs to be made explicit in the
instruction to ensure that participants report comparable goal
conflicts.
Once we have clarified the definition and operationalization
of goal conflict, we can move on to gain insight into how
goal conflict affects individuals’ actions and well-being and how
individuals may best cope with goal conflict.
Limitations of the Present Review
The present review focused personal goals, that is to say,
goals set on a mid-level of abstraction that guide individuals’
behavior over an extended period. We assume that personal
goals are consciously accessible to individuals and, therefore,
goal-pursuit as well as struggles to pursue and attain such goals
may be verbalized. However, we acknowledge that unconscious
processes of goal activation and goal-shielding are important
to understand the extent and impact of goal conflict in
people’s everyday lives (Kleiman and Hassin, 2011). Hence,
broadening the view to include subconscious processes of
self-control and self-regulation, goal-like constructs that are
not attached to personal goals but nevertheless affect people’s
course of action (e.g., desires, Hofmann et al., 2012) need
to be taken into consideration as well (for an overview
see Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007; Dijksterhuis and Aarts,
2010).
By focusing on goal conflict as a keyword, we excluded
research that might be considered closely related to goal conflict,
such as studies on work-life balance (e.g., Beauregard and Henry,
2009) or role conflict (e.g., Jackson and Schuler, 1985). Because
goals may oftentimes arise from social roles (e.g., being a parent,
being an employee), some role conflict may directly translate into
goal conflict. Hence, these lines of research may offer important
insights and should be considered in future research on goal
conflict when the goal conflict under investigation encompasses
several life domains or social roles, for example.
In addition, goal properties (Austin and Vancouver,
1996) may play a vital role in the experience of and
reaction to goal conflict. In this sense, the notion of
vertical goal conflict or self-concordance of subordinate
goals in relation to higher-order self-defining goals and
needs within one goal system (cf. Sheldon and Kasser, 1995)
seems crucial also with regard to conflicts between two
or more goal systems (Senécal et al., 2001; Gorges et al.,
2014).
Concluding Remarks
In sum, goal conflict is a highly complex construct that needs
more careful conceptualization and definition prior to empirical
investigations and consistent transformations of these definitions
into ways to measure goal conflict. Within our review of
theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of goal conflict,
we have summarized and highlighted potential paths that may
be taken to further our understanding of goal conflict. Learning
more about the complex interplay of multiple factors that precede
goal conflict and lead to its detrimental effects will enable us
to see threats of (rising) goal conflict quite early and probably
help people to minimize interruptions by, or even avoid, goal
conflict.
Our intention was to help arrange ideas and to increase
awareness with respect to the many details that need attention
in studies on goal conflict. We would like to invite researchers
to tackle the challenges outlined in this article. We should
make an effort to develop comparable research designs to
promote converging evidence and to arrive at a common ground
regarding the conceptualization of goal conflict. It may be wise
to distinguish between a narrow definition, a broad definition,
and maybe even a definition in between to get hold of goal
conflict from different theoretical angles. In fact, we refer to
goal conflict as a moving target in the title of this manuscript
because in writing this review, goal conflict kept changing
its form, theoretical foundations, and hypothetical effects in
our minds. Because conceptualizations of goal conflict heavily
influence empirical approaches to the study of goal conflict and—
consequently—interpretation of empirical findings, we need to
be more attentive to conceptual details and more explicit about
presuppositions when doing research on goal conflict. A more
integrated approach and consideration of related lines of research
should hold great potential for the critical advancement of theory
building and empirical research with respect to antecedents,
experience, and consequences of goal conflict. Its complexity
and sensitivity to different perspectives will make research on
goal conflict difficult. Nevertheless, we hope that intraindividual
personal goal conflict will be addressed more in the future
and that our account of goal conflict presented here will be
of relevance to these studies and their results, in an attempt
to further our conceptualization and understanding of goal
conflict.
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